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This paper describes a theory of inheritance theories. We present an original theory of inheritance in nonmonotonic hierarchies. The structures on which this theory is based delineate a framework that subsumes most inheritance theories in the literature, providing a new foundation for inheritance.
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"* We prove that true skeptical inheritance is not contained in the language of path-based inheritance.
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Introduction
Inheritance reasoning is ubiquitous. Hierarchies provide a concise encoding of much of our comrmonsense knowledge. They appear in various guises in the literature of artificial intelligence, but also throughout the various arts and sciences. Open nearly any textbook, and some hierarchy is likely to appear. Reasoning with inheritance hierarchies is of particular interest to the artificial intelligence community because hierarchies are not only useful and native to human reasoning, but also simple and often tractable. The simplicity of the "inheritance problem" makes it attractive as a topic that can be considered in its entirety; its tractability makes it practical for the implementation of knowledge representation systems.
In this paper, we present several equivalent formulations of inheritance reasoning. Each approach may be useful in a particular context; by demonstrating their equivalence, we show that the most appropriate definition may be chosen. The techniques that we develop here generalize to a broad class of existing systems, providing a unified foundation for inheritance theory and a basis for comparative analysis, as well as extending previous results.
We begin, in section 2, by providing an intuitive description of what we intend by inheritance reasoning. We view inheritance hierarchies as representing primitive assertions in the knowledge base of some reasoning agent, and the inheritance problem as that of determining the agent's derived beliefs. The work in the remainder of this paper builds on this foundation.
In section 3, we give a formal path-based definition of inheritance. A path-based inheritance theory gives rules describing the admissible conclusions of a hierarchy. The theory presented here combines rules concerning the transitivity of primitive assertions with an ambiguity-resolution criterion to be invoked when two paths conflict. We describe the transitivity component by the notion of reachability; the resolution criterion is captured by specificity.
In section 4, we describe a model-theoretic semantics for inheritance hierarchies. A hierarchy defines a space of possible world-states--credulous extensions--or unambiguous interpretations. Specificity induces a preference relation over these world-states. In the resulting preferential semantics, each world-state has a classical model-theoretic interpretation, and the interpretation of an inheritance hierarchy is the set of models of preferred world-states. We demonstrate that the path-based theory of section 3 is sound and complete with respect to this model theory.
The model-theoretic semantics that we describe in section 4 differs from previous semantics for inheritance hierarchies by separating the model preference criterion-specificity-from the semantic space. The language of credulous extensions is a common basis for the semantics of inheritance systems. By varying the definition of specificity-selecting different sets of preferred extensionswe obtain model-theoretic semantics for diverse inheritance theories. We present an alternate specificity criterion in section 8. Section 5 describes a tractable algorithm for computing the inferences supported by an inheritance hierarchy. This is the first tractable theory for credulous inheritance-reasoning about what might be. Previous tractable inheritance theories have been limited to skeptical reasoningcomputing what must be-or to an otherwise limited subset of the credulous conclusions.
In section 6, we present a reason maintenance labeling scheme for inheritance reasoners. We label each node of the hierarchy with a propositional formula corresponding to the conditions under which the associated inference-a is-or is-not-a z-holds. These labels keep track of all of the possible (or preferred) interpretations of an inheritance hierarchy simultaneously, allowing us to draw contingent conclusions and reason about the interrelatedness of inferences.
In section 7, we use the reason maintenance labeling to define and investigate the problem of ideally skeptical inheritance-computing the intersection of credulous extensions. Where credulous inheritance is analogous to propositional satisfiability, the ideally skeptical conclusions of a hierarchy are its theorems, or valid conclusions. We demonstrate that previous "skeptical" theories are not ideally skeptical, and prove that no purely path-based inheritance definition can compute the ideally skeptical conclusions of an inheritance hierarchy.
Section 8 and 9 examine several previous theories of inheritance. Section 8 replicates the work in the body of this paper for off-path inheritance. In section 9, we make more general comparisons with existing inheritance research and position our work in that larger context.
Hierarchies as Belief Spaces
In this section, we present an intuitive interpretation of inheritance hierarchies. In later sections, we give formal definitions of these ideas; here, we hope to motivate that more formal work by answering the question of "what we mean" when we draw an inheritance hierarchy. Regrettably, most previous theories of inheritance omit such a statement of intent, and the lack of such an intuitive semantics has been one of the criticisms levelled against the entire inheritance endeavor (c.f. Woods [42] , Brachman [7] , Bacchus [4] , etc.).
Our interpretation of inheritance hierarchies is relatively simple. Each arc in an inheritance hierarchy-such as figure 1-represents an atomic assertion in the knowledge base of some reasoning agent-what this agent "believes," if you will.' Since this paper deals exclusively with defeasible inheritance, it is possible that an arc in the hierarchy-an atomic belief-is mistaken (e.g., lumberjacks might not, in fact, be RealrM men); however, in this agent's world-model, each of these atomic assertions holds.
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eoss jo~yer eater does not defeat either the assertion that Joe is a ReaITM man, or the assertion that ReaJTM men are generally hearty eaters; it merely makes Joe an atypical RealTM man. In the absence of conflicting information, the world-model of our reasoner is constrained so that subclasses and individuals are typical of their superclasses. Finally, we have the third kind of defeasibility in inheritance hierarchies: the defeasibility of ambiguous conclusions. Unlike the defeasibility of atomic assertions or that of derived (but uncontested) conclusions, ambiguity's defeasibility arises when there are two explicit and conflicting arguments. In figure 2 , the derived conclusion that platypuses are mammals is directly opposed by the (equally legitimate) conclusion that platypuses are not mammals. In this case, even the reasoning agent is assumed to be aware of the defeasibility. Indeed, we interpret such a hierarchy as asserting that the world must be in such a state that either platypuses are mammals, or they are not; but this reasoner does not know which. That is, the atomic assertions hold; and the assertions In some maximal consistent subset of their transitive closures hold; but there may be several such subsets, corresponding to several possible states of the world.
The situation here is not as hopeless as it may sound. First, the reasoner may prefer one of these possible world.states. For example, in figure 3 , there are derived paths asserting that blue whales are aquatic creatures (by virtue of their being whales, which are explicitly aquatic) and that blue whales are not aquatic (by virtue of their being mammals). If we were reasoning about whales, this conflict would be easily resolved: the assertion that whales are aquatic is explicit, and therefore blocks the derived assertion (through mammals) that whales are not aquatic. In the case of blue whales, we can resolve this ambiguity by resorting to arguments about specificity. Because blue whales are mammals only by virtue of being whales, information about whales is more specific to blue whales than information about mammals, and the reasoner prefers to believe that the actual world-state is one in which blue whales are aquatic. We discuss the notion of specificity, and the selection of preferred world-states, in greater detail below.
Second, even in truly ambiguous cases-such as r 2 -the inheritance hierarchy may contain contingent information. In this case, the reasoner cannot determine whether the actual world corresponds to the possible world-state in which platypuses are mammals, or that in which they are not. However, the reasoner can assert that if the actual world-state is such that platypuses are mammals, then it follows that platypuses produce milk. In this fashion, the hierarchy supports conclusions relative to a particular possible world-state.
A Path-Based Definition
A path-based theory of inheritance is one which defines the admissible conclusions of an inheritance hierarchy to be precisely the set of conclusions supported by admissible paths in the hierarchy. For example, the reason that lumberjacks are believed to be hearty eaters (according to figure 1) is that there is a path from lumberjack through RealTM man to hearty eater in rl. Like proof theories, path-based inheritance theories give almost algorithmic characterizations of the process by which conclusions are derived. In some cases, they lead to tractable inference procedures. In general, however, path-based inheritance theories lack model-theoretic semantics. Previous pathbased theories of inheritance include the work of Touretzky, Horty, and Thomason [18, 17, 19, 38, 39, 40, 41] , Sandewall [32] , and Geffner and Verma [14] .
In this section, we present a path-based theory of inheritance. In section 4 we describe a modeltheoretic semantics for which this path-based theory is sound and complete. In section 5, we present an 0(n 4 ) algorithm for computing the conclusions of an inheritance hierarchy supported by this path-based definition.
Our path-based inheritance theory is similar to that of Touretzky [39, 40] , save that it is upwards reasoning. Upwards inheritance reasons about the properties of some particular object, rather than about the set of objects possessing some particular property. Some ramifications of upwards vs. downwards inheritance are discussed by Touretzky et al. [41] ; the computational advantages of upwards inheritance are described by Levesque and Selman [33] (see also section 5, below).
The approach that we describe in this section is also credulous: it allows a conclusion whenever that conclusion is consistent with some (preferred) interpretation of the hierarchy; or, whenever it is a plausible conclusion of the reasoner's explicit beliefs. Thus, in a hierarchy like r 2 , we expect to draw both the conclusion that a platypus is-a mammal, and that a platypus is-not-a mammal. In section 6, we discuss the problem of contingent reasoning-determining the assumptions that underlie credulous conclusions. For example, we conclude that a platypus is-a milk-producer whenever we assume that it is-a mammal. In section 7, we discuss skeptical reasoning, in which only the certain-uncontested-conclusions of the hierarchy are considered. e Cd Figure 4 : A hierarchy is ambiguous w.r.t. a focus node.
The Framework
An inheritance hierarchy r = (Vr,Er) is a directed acyclic graph with positive and negative edges, intended to denote "is-a" and "is-not-a" respectively. We write a positive edge from a to z as a. z, and a negative edge a. -z. We call a sequence of positive edges aa. . a,'," -z (n Ž_ 0),3 a positive path, and a sequence of positive edges followed by a single negative edge a -. , ... s,, "z (n > 0) a negative path.
A path, or argument, a. a ... a,, " (-,)z supports the inference "a is (not) an z." We use the notation a--+z (resp., a-/+z) to stand for this inference, or conclusion, independently of the path through which it is derived. One inference-e.g., a--.z-may have many supporting argumentsa. sl...:n z,a.tl--.tm.z, etc.
Given an inheritance hierarchy r = (Vr, Er) with nodes a,z E Vr, we say that z is reachable from a (alternately, a-reachable) if there is some path a. We say that a hierarchy 1r is a-connected if every node in Vr and every edge in Er is reachable from a. When reasoning about an inheritance hierarchy w.r.t. a particular node, we call that node the focus node.
Ambiguity arises when two paths conflict. Formally, an inheritance hierarchy r is ambiguous wr.t. a node a if there is some node : E Vr such that both a -s""... ".z and a-tl-.-t,. .-,z are in Er. In this case, we say that the ambiguity is at z. Ambiguity is always relative to a focus node:
for example, r 4 is unambiguous w.r.t. a, but ambiguous w.r.t. b (at e).
Our definition of ambiguity differs from the conventional one. First, we introduce the notion of ambiguity w.r.t. a focus node. To previous theories, the hierarchy in figure 4 is simply ambiguous: w.r.t. a or b or c or d or e. Second, our definition of ambiguity is stronger than that in the literature.
For example, by our definition, r 3 is ambiguous w~r.t. whale. This reflects the fact that there are paths whale • aquatic creature and whale • mammal. --aquatic creature in Er 3 . We shall see in the next section that specificity resolves this ambiguity and the conclaons derivable from r 3 are unambiguous. Previous inheritance theories do not distinguish between resolvable ambiguities- 3 The notation a.*.1 •82 abbreviates the set of edges (a-&I, .I" 2); *1 ., a, abbreviates (&I *8,"3
. .
such as that in figure 3 -and unambiguous hierarchies such as figure 1. Hierarchies with ambiguous conclusion sets-like figure 2-we term truly ambiguous wzr. 
Specificity
A specificity criterion, or preemption strategy, makes admissibility choices among certain competing paths. The idea of specificity dates from Touretzky's inferential distance [39, 40] . Since then, many definitions of specificity have appeared in the literature, but all operate on the same underlying principle: more specific information is more directly relevant. For example, in figure 3 , information about whales is more specific to blue whales than information about mammals, so we can infer that blue whales are aquatic.
The framework that we have presented so far is compatible with many of the existing definitions of specificity. In this section, we present an original definition. Our specificity criterion closely resembles Touretzky's original notion of specificity [39, 40] , but which is computable in polynomial time (see section 5). In section 8, we describe an alternate definition of specificity-one resembling that of Sandewall [32] and Horty et at. [18, 19] -and show how to integrate that definition into this framework. Intuitively, an edge is admissible if there is a non-redundant admissible path leading to it that contains no preempting intermediaries.
A path is admissible in r w.r.t. a if every edge in that path is admissible.
A node s is a preemptor 4 of v. z (resp., v. --z) w.r.t. a if s. -z E Er (resp., s3 z E Er). For example, the positive edge from whale to aquatic preempts the negative edge from mammal to aquatic, w.r.t. both whale and blue whale.
The difficulties caused by redundant links were noted by Touretzky [39, 40] : Consider r 2 augmented by an additional edge from blue whale to mammal. This edge would be redundant: blue whales ate typically mammals even without the explicit assertion. However, if the edge from blue whale to mammal were not excluded, there would be an admissible path blue whale • mammal.
-iaquatic creature-no intermediate node is a preemptor of mammal. --aquatic creature. Clearly, this is not the intended meaning here (or, indeed, in any network of this form, since the "whale" node is always more specific than the "mammal" node (w.r.t. "blue whales")).
An edge b.w is redundant in r w.r.t. focus node aif there is some positive path b-tl ... t'.w E Er, m > 1, for which 4Perhaps "potential preemptor" would be a better term: if s is not on any (admissible, non-redundant, positive) path from a to v, then a effectively has no bearing on the admissibility of v. (-,)z. This is because preemptors are checked only in condition 3 of the definition of admissibility. In [35, 37, 36], we gave a stronger-and incorrectcondition here.
1. Each of the edges of b. t.
• -" t,,, is admissible in r w~r.t. a, 2. There are no c and i such that c --iti is admissible in r w.r.t. a; there is no c such that c. -itw is admissible in r w.r.t. a.
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Redundant edges may themselves be admissible. For example, an edge from blue whale to mammal in figure 3 would be admissible w.r.t. blue whale. However, redundant edges may not contribute to the admissibility of other edges: mammal---aquatic creature is not admissible w.r.t. blue whale, in spite of the admissible path blue whale , mammal. Conditions 2 and 3 in the definition of admissibility hold for the path blue whale -mammal, aquatic creature, but condition 1 is violated.
The path-based definition of supports yields the following conclusions on the hierarchy r 2 in figure 2: In this case, specificity resolves the ambiguities w~r.t. blue whale and whale at aquatic creature. As a --sult, r 3 ji blue whale]-aquatic creature and r3 6 whale-,4aquatic creature
The same set of conclusions would result if we added a redundant edge from blue whale to mammal.
Model-theoretic Semantics
The path-based inheritance theory of the previous section is a sort of "proof theory" for inheritance: given a hierarchy, it describes the rules by which conclusions may be drawn. In this section, we present a model-theoretic approach to understanding the meaning of an inheritance hierarchy. Rather than the admissible conclusions, this section speaks of the possible world-states-credulous extensions-that are "models" satisfying the constraints imposed by the hierarchy. In essence, ' Although the definitions of admissibility and redundancy are mutually dependent, they are not circular. Because the hierarchy is acyclic, it can be ordered topologically, and the definition of an admissible edge v -(-')z depends only on the redundancy of edges with endpoints strictly topologically earlier than z.
this section makes rigorous the informal characterization of the meaning of inheritance hierarchies described in section 2.
Previous theories of inheritance semantics have been translational: a hierarchy is expressed as a set of statements in some particular (nonmonotonic) logic, and the semantics of the logic provide semantics for the hierarchy. For example, McCarthy [27] , Haugh [161, and Krishnaprasad, Kifer, and Warren [22, 23] translate inheritance hierarchies into particular circumscriptive theories [26] ; Etherington and Reiter [11, 12, 13] treat hierarchies as theories of Reiter's default logic [31] ; Przymusinska and Gelfond [15, 30] use Moore's autoepistemic logic [29] as a target language; Bacchus [4] bases his translation on a probabilistic logic; and Boutilier [6] uses a conditional logic.
While the semantics provided by most of these theories are as satisfying as the semantics of the underlying logics, they are less semantics of inheritance than theories of how inheritance relates to (or can be expressed in) those logics. In contrast, the theory that we present here is a theory of direct semantics for inheritance hierarchies. Hierarchies define a space of possible interpretations, or models. Specificity-drawn from the topological properties of the hierarchy-is used as a preference criterion over these models. The meaning of the hierarchy is the set of its maximally preferred models. The result is a preferential semantics like those of Bossu and Siegel [5], Etherington [10, 12] , and Shoham [34] for more general nonmonotonic logics.
Further, virtually every previous-translational or path-based-approach to inheritance semantics contains a fixed ambiguity-resolving preemption strategy. 6 Although the selection of an appropriate preemption strategy is still a subject for debate in the inheritance literature (see, e.g., Touretzky et al.'s discussion of the "Clash of Intuitions" [41] ), existing systems of inheritance assume some single, fixed strategy. Preemption strategies are variously embedded in the mechanics of path construction, the translation procedure, or the underlying nonmonotonic logic. This makes it extraordinarily difficult to compare underlying preemption strategies. As a result, most so-called "comparisons of inheritance theories" are in reality ad hoc comparisons of system performances on selected examples.
In contrast, our semantics is modular. We reduce a hierarchy to its possible interpretations, or credulous extensions. Our semantics for individual extensions is independent of the specificity criterion used to select among extensions. The credulous extension semantics generalize to arbitrary upwards inheritance theories, providing a common base for their semantics. By combining with different selection strategies, these extensions-possible world-states-give sound and complete model-theoretic semantics for alternate inheritance theories. This means we can compare the ambiguity-resolving heuristics of various inheritance theories directly and theoretically, rather than by resorting to ad hoc analysis of specific examples. We make use of this generality to explore off-path inheritance in section 8, below.
Semantics for Credulous Extensions
We focus first on the problem of providing a model-theoretic semantics for P single, unambiguous "credulous extension." In general, we believe that a translational approach t, .neritance semantics is undesirable. Such an approach trades the topological information inherent in a hierarchy for the semantics for an existing logic. In particular, translational approaches provide less-than-satisfactory means for dealing with ambiguities. Often, they merely adopt the ambiguity-resolving strategy of the target logic, which may not be appropriate for inheritance hierarchies. Where they do provide additional, explicit ambiguity resolution, it is fixed as a part of the translation procedure.
The approach to semantics for credulous eztensions that we present here is translational. However, it is not subject to these criticisms of translational approaches precisely because it provides 6The exception to this is Haugh [16] ; see the discussion of his work in section 9, below.
translations only for credulous extensions-unambiguous subhierarchies-and not for a hierarchy as a whole. Thus, it does not rely on the translation procedure or the underlying logic for ambiguityresolution strategies. All ambiguity-resolution is done in the (non-translational) process of selecting some preferred subset of the credulous extensions; once the set of credulous extensions-or possible interpretations-for a hierarchy has been established, the semantics for any single extension are straightforward. In the next section, we discuss the problem of deriving the appropriate preferences over credulous extensions.
A credulous extension corresponds to a possible world-state-one in the space of world-states defined by inheritance ambiguity. Formally, a credulous extension of an inherita-re hierarchy r with respect to a node a is a maximal unambiguous a-connected subhierarchy of r with respect to a: if Xr is a credulous extension of r w.r. Several previous inheritance theories include a related but distinct concept. Touretzky [40] based his inheritance theory on a construct that he called a grounded expansion. Sandewall [32] used the term extension to refer to structures much like Touretzky's grounded expansions. However, our credulous extensions differ from Touretzky's grounded expansions and Sandewall's extensionswe will call them both ezpansions-in two significant ways. First, their expansions are supersets of the hierarchy-the original hierarchy plus some additional, "disambiguating" information. For example, in r 2 , one expansion adds the additional edge platypus, mammal, while another adds platypus. -,mammal. In our terms, their expansions are themselves ambiguous hierarchies. Second, their expansions are of the hierarchy as a whole, while ours are w.r.t. a particular focus node.
To Touretzky and Sandewall, r 2 simply has two expansions, period. In our theory, r 2 has two credulous extensions w.r.t. platypus, but only one w.r.t. egg-layer or mammal. In both of these ways, our credulous extensions correspond more closely to the extension of a predicate or of a default logic theory than to past definitions of the expansion of an inheritance hierarchy.
Because a credulous extension is unambiguous, every edge is admissible. Thus, instead of Xr J> a--z--there is an admissible positive path from a to z-we need merely check that there is some positive path from a to z (resp., a 7 4 z and negative path). We make use of this to provide a straightforward model-theoretic semantics for a single extension:
For every vertex z E Vxr, we create a unique propositional variable i. Xr is the theory (in the propositional calculus) given by ii A~iD
Since Xr is unambiguous, XJ is consistent and has a model.
In other words, we translate the edges of Xr. into material implications, allowing inference chains exactly when there are paths in the credulous extension. It would be nice if all of inheritance semantics were this easy. However, Thomason et al. demonstrate that the translation into propositional logic does not work even in the simpler case of strict (non-defeasible) inheritance [38] , where local inconsistency in a hierarchy would lead to a globally inconsistent theory. In the general defeasible case, the propositional theory corresponding to an ambiguous inheritance hierarchy would be inconsistent. The only reason that the translation into a propositional theory works here is that it is the translation of a credulous extension: an unambiguous subhiezarchy. Ambiguity resolution must therefore be applied in selecting the credulous extensions that are the preferred interpretations of the original hierarchy. Once we have chosen the preferred extensions-as we discuss in the next section-this translational semantics provides the desired result. The following theorem states that support-the existence of an admissible path-is equivalent to entailment in the propositional theory. Thus the path-based definition of support for credulous eztensions is sound and complete w.r.t. the modeltheoretic semantics defined here.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness for Credulous Extensions)
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a, z E Vr. Let Xr be a credulous eztension of r w.r.t. a, and let Xir be the propositional theory corresponding to Xr. The following are equivalent:
2. z is positively a-reachable in Xr (resp., negatively a-reachable).
xr F i (resp., i).

xZ 1= i(,esp., -)
This follows directly from the fact that every path in a credulous extension is admissible. Full proofs of all theorems may be found in appendix A.
Selecting Preferred Extensions
Given a single credulous extension, we have seen how to derive a model-theoretic interpretation of that extension. In fact, the semantics of the previous section would work any time we began with an unambiguous inheritance hierarchy (which would have only a single credulous extension w.r.t. any focus node). But inheritance hierarchies are generally ambiguous. As a result, r may have several extensions w.r.t. a given focus node, a. Some of these extensions may be more intuitive than others.
In this section, we describe a means of selecting the preferred (more intuitive) extensions of r w.r.t. a. The semantics of r are then simply the sets of interpretations for the preferred extensions of r w.r.t. the nodes of Vr.
In inheritance hierarchies, specificity gives us a means of ruling out unintuitive interpretations. Thus, we use the definition of admissibility according to specificity, from section 3.2, above, to define the preference relation over credulous extensions. We say that one extension is preferred to another if it is "more consistent" with the constraints of specificity:
Let Xr and Yr be two credulous extensions of an inheritance hierarchy r w.r.t. focus node a. If a credulous extension is minimal under this preorder-i.e. no other extension is preferred to it-we call it a preferred extension of the hierarchy:
Pref(r,a) = (Xr I Vyr, yr Xr Theorem 2 is a soundness and completeness theorem for the path-based definition of section 3 w.r.t. the complete model-theoretic semantics defined here: selecting preferred extensions and providing translational semantics for those preferred extensions. In section 8, we demonstrate that other inheritance theories, with other definitions of specificity, can be described in these terms. This enables us to use the definitions of this section and section 3 to give similar soundness and completeness results for several existing inheritance theories.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and Completeness)
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a,z E Vr, and let Pref(f, a)be the set of preferred eztensions of r w.r.t. a. Then r I> a--*z if there is some preferred eztension Xj E lPref(r, a) such that X.r I-(re,., a-4 z and i
The complete model-theoretic interpretation of r 2 in figure 2, is therefore the set of models of preferred extensions. In this case, specificity cannot disambiguate the hierarchy, and both extensions ire preferred. The propositional theories w.r.t. platypus are
$That is, if every topological sort places a and t before x, then XE and Yr agree on edges -(")t.
'Since r I> a--z whenever some preferred extension (of r w~r.t. a) entails ;, I> is analogous to propositional satisfiability. This is the essence of credulous inheritance: a conclusion is admissible if there is some (preferred) possiible world-state supporting it. In section 7, we discuss the problem of skeptical inheritance-"valid" conclusionsentailed by all preferred possible world-states. In terms of the framework of this section, these are the conclusions supported by all preferred credulous extensions. and the hierarchy entails the inferences that a whale is-a whale, mammal, and aquatic creature. The hierarchy is unambiguous w.r.t. mammals and aquatic creatures, so there is only one credulous extension w.r.t. each of these:
and a mammal is-a mammal, but is-not-a aquatic creature; and aquatic creature so an aquatic creature is-a aquatic creature.
blue U~e 
Computing Specificity
The preference criterion approach to ambiguity resolution is satisfying fronm a semantic perspective, but it does not tell us much about how to derive the preferred extensions of a hierarchy. In this section, we give a polynomial-time-0(nS)-algorithm for computing r, the specificity eztension of r w.r.t. a. This algorithm demonstrates that upwards inheritance is tractable for credulous (goal-directed) on-path reasoning. In section 7, we extend this result to include ideally skeptical reasoning; in section 8, we give a similar algorithm for off-path inheritance.
There are several other computational theories of inheritance in' the literature. Those of Horty et al. [18, 19] and Haugh [16] as well as the ambiguity-propagating algorithm of our [36, section 4] are "skeptical"-they attempt to compute only those conclusions that are unopposed. We discuss skeptical theories in section 7, below, where we show that none of these previous theories are ideally skeptical. Geffner and Verma [14] also offer an algorithm that is sound but incomplete for their inheritance theory. No previous path-based theory has been shown tractable for credulous inheritance.
Etherington [12, p. 89] gives an algorithm for finding extensions of general default theories. Kautz and Selman [21, theorem 1] have adapted this algorithm to find a single (arbitrary) extension of a disjunction-free ordered default theory. This class includes the inheritance theory of Etherington and Reiter [12, 13] . However, Kautz and Selman's 0(n 2 ) algorithm finds only a single arbitrary extension of the hierarchy, and cannot be used to determine whether a particular conclusion is supported. Indeed, Kautz and Selman demonstrate that goal-directed reasoningdetermining whether there is an extension supporting some particular conclusion-is, for ordered default theories, A/P-hard [21, theorem 3] . Similarly, they show that skeptical reasoning for the same class of theories is ANP-hard [21, theorem 7] . In [33, theorem 2], Levesque and Selman demonstrate that downward inheritance reasoning (as espoused, e.g., by Touretzky [39, 40] ) is Y/P-hard, whether skeptical or credulous, on-or off-path.
Our algorithm is therefore the first sound and complete algorithm for credulous inheritance reasoning. It generates Er the specificity extension of r w.r.t. a.
r is a subhierarchy of r containing only and exactly the admissible edges of r w.r.t. a. For example, the specificity extension of the hierarchy in figure 3 w.r.t. blue whale is shown in figure 7 .
The following algorithm always yields a unique specificity extension Er for a hierarchy r w.r.t.
focus node a.
COMPUTE-SPECIFICITY-EXTENSION (r,a)
Let Er contain the a-reachable nodes of r, and no edges. Constructing Er is 0(n 5 )
The following theorem is essentially a proof of correctness for COMPUTE-SPECIFICITY-EXTENSION. It says that Er. contains all and only those edges of r that are admissible w.r.t.
a.
Theorem 4 (Correctness of COMPUTE-SPECIPICITY-EXTENSION)
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a E Vr, and let Er be the specificity extension
The subhierarchy of admissible (w.r.t. a) edges in r may still be ambiguous. For example, all of the edges in a diamond ambiguity such as the platypus diamond of figure 2 are admissible;
Fplatypus, the specificity extension of r 2 w.r.t. platypus, is simply r 2 and, like r 2 , has two credulous extensions wr.t. platypus. However, the ambiguities that can be resolved by specificity have been:
the credulous extensions of E.r are precisely the preferred credulous extensions of r w.r.t. a. This means that an inference a--z is supported by r-alternately, a preferred credulous extension of r w.r.t. a entails i-iff z is positively a-reachable in Err. Since verifying reachability is linear in the number of edges, it follows that computing the credulous conclusions of r is also tractable.
Corollary 4.3 (Complexity of Credulous Inheritance)
Deciding whether r J> a-z is 0(n') (resp., a 7 4 z).
Reason Maintenance and Inheritance
In this section, we define a reason maintenance system for inheritance hierarchies. A reason maintenance system is a construction that keeps track of the assumptions or justifications supporting a particular conclusion; several systems of this type appear in the literature [8, 9, 24, 25, 28] .
In the case of inheritance hierarchies, the reason maintenance system keeps track of the multiple credulous extensions of a hierarchy (w.r.t. each node), using a set of propositional labels for the nodes of that hierarchy. This function mimics the behavior of de Kleer's assumption-based truth maintenance system (ATMS) [8]; when we introduced the labeling scheme in [35], we called it the A TMS-labeling of the hierarchy.
The reason maintenance labeling keeps track of all of the possible interpretations-the credulous extensions-at once. We exploit this feature to draw contingent conclusions: that is, to determine what follows if we make a certain assumption. For example, in figure 2, we can conclude that if platypuses are mammals, then they produce milk. In section 7, below, we use the labeling to examine the problem of skeptical inheritance-computing what conclusions hold in every credulous extension.
For each pair of nodes, a and z, in Vr we define two labels: IzJ]r, the conditions under which a is an z, and [r-., the conditions under which a is not an z. In general, we might reason about whether a is an z in some particular r as follows:
Let (1o8r(z) be the "positive children" of z in r-the nodes Pi E Vr with positive edges p. z E Er-and let Oiegr(z) be the "negative children" of z in r-n On the other hand, if a is a p, for some p E qPOr(z), but a is definitely not an n for any of z's negative children n, then a is also an z: z's positive children provide it with a supporting argument, and there are no explicit counterarguments. That yields
Finally, it could be that at least one of Ioer(z) is true, but at least one of legr(Z) is also true. In this case, z is ambiguous: it has some support, but there is also a counterargument. If z is ambiguous, its value is unconstrained. In some credulous extensions, we would expect [zJr to be true, and in others it should be false. When this situation arises, z becomes a choice-point and we introduce i-the free variable corresponding to the node z-into the labeling scheme. The truth value assigned to i shouldn't matter most of the time, but in this special circumstance-when [Qr(z)JJ, and JGaeqr(z)]jr, so z is ambiguous-we want There is a similar labeling scheme for 171r., the conditions under which r ý> a 7 4 z:
1. a]rM = [±]: a is never a non-a. . Although this label says very littleplatypuses are mammals in those extensions in which they are mammals-the propagation of labels yestypsr = [mammal]-platypuses are also milk-producers in precisely those extensions in which they are mammals. This is exactly the sort of contingent reasoning that we would expect our interpretation of inheritance hierarchies to capture.
Theorem 5 demonstrates that these labels keep track of all of the credulous extensions of a hierarchy at once. In the following sections, we present several useful corollaries of this theorem.
Theorem 5 (Correspondence Theorem)
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a, z E Vr. Then there is a correspondence between the set of credulous extensions of r w.r.t. a, and the truth-assignments to the free variables in the labels of r w.r.t. a, such that the truth-assignment assigns Of course, reachability is not really what we are interested in. r supports an inference if its conclusion is reachable by an admissible path, not just any path. That is, the labels are not taking into account specificity-the preemption of an argument by a more specific counterargument.
Happily, we have a way of constructing the subhierarchy of admissible edges in r w.r.t. a-this is Er. It follows immediately from theorem ?? and corollary 5.1 that satisfiability of the labels of w.r.t. a corresponds to admissibility in r w.r.t. a, i.e. 1>.
Corollary 5.2
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a, z E Vr, and let Ej be the specificity extension of r w.r.t. a. Then x]ExrJ is satisfiable iff r 1> a--+z (reap., ,,IE and aý+x).
This means that to take specificity into account-to reason only about F's preferred extensions w.r.t. a-we can simply apply COMPUTE-SPECIFICITY-EXTENSION to r, a and label the resulting Er. Any contingent conclusions-or, as we shall see in the next section, skeptical conclusions-that we draw using the labels of Er w.r.t. a apply to r taking specificity into account. An alternative but more complex approach to labeling with specificity might be to integrate the specificity criterion directly into the labeling scheme. In this case, we would condition the acceptance of a node on its non-preempted children. Unfortunately, even for a relatively simple preemption scheme such as the one described in section 3.2, these labels are quite complicated. For example, the "specificity label" for a-*z is On each line, the left-hand portion-~ rja or [nlr--is simply the old term ()our(z) or GzegF(z)-z's children-and the right-hand portion formalizes "and that child is not preempted." For more complex preemption schemes, such as that described in section 8, the labels become still more complicated. Fortunately, we do not have to resort to embedding specificity in the labeling scheme. The specificity extension of a hierarchy provides us with precisely the information we need-a subhierarchy containing only admissible edges-and simple reachability in the specificity extension is equivalent to reachability by an admissible path in the complete hierarchy. Thus, instead of using the more complex "specificity labels" on the full hierarchy, we can compute the specificity extension of the hierarchy and use the simpler labels defined in section 6, above.
We can use this labeling in updating the hierarchy. Consider, for example, the hierarchy of figure 2. If we later discover that platypuses are mammals, the labeling automatically tells us that they are milk-producers as well (since . In fact, we can incorporate various types of ambiguity resolving informationfrom domain-specific knowledge to updated beliefs-into this labeling simply by adding further constraints.
The complexity of this extended labeling algorithm, including further constraints, is unknown. Since it is a special case of boolean satisfiability, the problem may be APP-hard. However, for the limited case of determining that a label is falsifiable-i.e., that there is some credulous extension in which the corresponding inference does not hold-there is a polynomial algorithm due to Kautz and Selman [21] . In the next section, we explore the problem of skeptical inheritance: computing the intersection of credulous extensions.
Skeptical Inheritance
Up to this point, we have been discussing credulous inheritance-reasoning in which a conclusion that holds in some plausible (preferred) extension is acceptable. This type of reasoning is analogous to finding satisfiable sentences. In this section, we discuss skeptical inheritance: computing those inferences that hold in all plausible interpretations. These conclusions are the valid consequences of the hierarchy-what must follow from the reasoners beliefs, no matter which possible world-state actually exists.
The labeling scheme of section 6 provides a language for expressing these two types of inheritance. We have seen that credulous inheritance permits a conclusion a--+z iff [z]Jr is satisfiable. Formally, ideally skeptical inheritance supports exactly those conclusions true in every (preferred) credulous extension. It follows from theorem 5 that a isa z in every credulous extension of r w.r. In the next sections, we present two path-based approaches to skeptical inheritance that have received some attention in the literature. We demonstrate that these approaches are not ideally skeptical: they do not compute exactly the always-true conclusions of a hierarchy. We show further that no path-based approach can be both sound and complete for ideally skeptical inheritance. The problem of ideally skeptical inheritance-intersecting credulous extensions-lies outside the language of path-based inheritance theories. The difficulty lies in the fact that some conclusions may be true in every credulous extension, but supported by different paths in each. Any pathbased theory must either accept one of these paths-and be unsound, since such a path is not in every extension--or reject all such paths-and with them the ideally skeptical conclusion-and be incomplete.
Ambiguity Blocking Inheritance
The first attempt at skeptical inheritance is due to Horty et at. [18, 19] ; 10 Haugh [16] gives an equivalent circumscriptive definition. They argue that an ambiguous line of reasoning should not " 1 According to Horty (personal communication), a "skeptical" approach to inheritance is one which offers a unique, unambiguous set of conclusions for any inheritance hierarchy. This differs with our intuition that "skeptical" means "unwilling to believe uncertain conclusions." In Horty's view, computing the intersection of the credulous extensions is only one way to reason "skeptically." be allowed to interfere with other potential conclusions. Because this approach discontinues a line of reasoning as soon as an ambiguity has been reached, Haugh calls it ambiguity blocking inheritance. Although Horty et aL, and Haugh describe a specific theory-including, e.g., a particular specificity criterion-ambiguity blocking inheritance potentially defines a general approach. We paraphrase ambiguity blocking inheritance here:
Let BF initially be r. Starting from the focus node a, consider each node a in topological order. If r is truly ambiguous w.r.t. a at z,11 remove all edges into and out of a from Bý. When the entire hierarchy has been scanned, B! is truly unambiguous w.r.t. a. This is the ambiguity blocking skeptical extension of r; ambiguity blocking inheritance concludes that a network r admits a--#a exactly when BF > a * . ,," a (resp., a7-z and a-s.-s,. --a) .
While ambiguity blocking inheritance seems reasonable, it results in some anomalous conclusions. Consider, for example, figure 9 . Ambiguity blocking inheritance on r with focus node a determines that e is ambiguous w.r.t. a, so it eliminates all edges to and from e. In particular, it eliminates the edge e--if, making f unambiguous w.r.t. a: B~r. ý> a--f. This is certainly one possibility. But it is also possible that a-ie; and if a-ie, it is unclear whether a--f-that is, a might not be an f. It is certainly not safe to assume from the ambiguity at e that the path a-b . d, f is always true. But this is precisely what ambiguity blocking inheritance does. This anomaly was first noted by Horty et al. [18, 41] .
A more severe anomaly follows from this first. Ambiguity blocking inheritance computes a kind of "parity" on the number of ambiguities in a path. According to ambiguity blocking inheritance, the network in figure 10 is skeptical as to whether a is-a e or an i, but allows the conclusions that a is-a g and a j. Similarly, this net is skeptical about whether b or f is-a j, but allows the paths from a and d to j. More than the first anomaly, this result calls into question the intuitiveness of ambiguity blocking inheritance. In any case, ambiguity blocking inheritance is unsound w.r.t. ideally skeptical inheritance: there are inferences a-'z such that Br j> a-*z, but [zJr is falsifiable. Figures 9 and 10 both illustrate this unsoundness of ambiguity blocking inheritance.
"11r is tndy ambdgno. w.r.t. a at z if r > a--z and r ý> az. Figure 11 : HJf results from ambiguity propagating inheritance.
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Ambiguity Propagating Inheritance
Ambiguity propagating inheritance allows ambiguous lines of reasoning to proceed. An argument thus cannot be certain unless there are no counterarguments; in contrast, ambiguity blocking, inheritance considers only unambiguous counterarguments. Like ambiguity blocking inheritance, ambiguity propagation defines a family of algorithms. Haugh [16] gives a circumscriptive definition; in [361, we describe an O(IErI) algorithm. Again, we paraphrase:
Starting from the focus node a, consider each node a of r in topological order. If r is truly ambiguous w.r.t. a at z, rather than eliminating all edges to and from z, retain z but mark it as ambiguous w.r.t. a. Although paths to and from a will not be included in the final result, they can still act as counterarguments during this processing and prevent other nodes from being unambiguous. llý is the a-connected subgraph of r with those edges z-(-')y E Er such that neither a nor y is marked ambiguous w.r.t. a.
For example, the cascading ambiguities of figures 9 and 10, which gave ambiguity blocking inheritance difficulty, present no problem for ambiguity propagating inheritance. Figure 11 shows Hr..
IIr. is sound wzr.t. ideally skeptical inheritance: if llr .> a--, then [air. is satisfiable. In fact, r.r computes the subhierarchy of r containing exactly those edges of r that are in every (preferred) credulous extension of r w.r.t. a. However, Hr. is incomplete: there are some inferences a--*z that are supported by every credulous extension of r w.r.t. a but have different supporting arguments in different extensions. These conclusions are not supported by Hr.. We demonstrate such a hierarchy in the next section. In these circumstances, we need to reason about inferences rather than paths.
Ideally Skeptical Inheritance
Consider the hierarchy in figure 12 .12 Every credulous extension w~r.t. seedless grape.vine supports the inference seedless grape vine--+plant, so ideally skeptical inheritance concludes that seedless grape vines are plants. Suppose, for example, that a seedless grape vine is a fruit plant; then it is a plant. Suppose that it is not a fruit plant; then it is unambiguously an arbor plant, and therefore There are facts which are true in all credulous extensions, but which have no justification in the intersection of those extensions. This is why we cannot generate an "ideally skeptical extension"-no particular set of edges of r from seedless grape vine to plant is in every credulous extension, so no such path can be in the "ideally skeptical extension." Thus every path-based approach to skeptical inheritance will always be either unsound or incomplete with respect to ideally skeptical inheritance.
Theorem 6
Any path-based inheritance theory will be either unsound or incomplete for ideally skeptical inheritance; the intersection of credulous eztensions is not a pathbased notion.
Proof: A path-based theory insists that admissible conclusions are only those supported by admissible paths.
If a path-based theory supports the conclusion seedlessgrape vine--plant, it must admit at least one path that supports seedless grape vine--plant. But the only paths that support seedless grape vine--+plant are seedless grape vine. grape vine . firuit plant, tree-plant and seedless grape vine . grape vine. vine. arbor plant , plant
Neither of these conclusions is in every credulous extenmion. A theory accepting either of these conclusions is therefore unsound for ideally skeptical inheritance. Alternately, a path-based theory can reject .both of these (unsound) paths. However, the theory then accepts no path supporting the conclusion seedless grape vine--* plant, so it cannot accept that conclusion. Since that conclusion holds in every credulous extension, such a path-based theory is incompleae for ideally skeptical inheritance.
This theorem deserves a few remarks. The first is that its proof depends only on the definition of a path-based theory and not on any particular properties of any individual path-based theory. r 7 does not involve specificity. It is therefore independent of any choice of specificity-criterion, and holds for all such criteria (assuming that no specificity criterion would resolve diamond ambiguities).
This result demonstrates that we can only compute the always-true inferences by, in effect, reasoning about all of the credulous extensions. Fortunately, in acyclic hierarchies, such reasoning is tractable. Corollary 5.3 establishes that a conclusion holds in the intersection of preferred credulous extensions (of r w.r.t. a) whenever ýa]JaJ" (resp. []a) is valid. In section 5, we demomnstrated that constructing Er-eliminating specificity-requires polynomial time. Kautz and Selman [211 describe a polymonial time procedure for computing the validity of a label (without specificity). By applying Kautz and Selman's algorithm to Er, we can compute the intersection of preferred credulous extensions-ideally skeptical inheritance-in polynomial time. 
Off-Path Inheritance
The inheritance theory presented above uses a specificity criterion called on-path preemption. In this type of ambiguity-resolution, an edge is inadmissible if every non-redundant admissible prefix contains a preemptor. In this section, we consider an alternate specificity criterion: that of off-path preemption. In off-path preemption, an edge is inadmissible if any admissible prefix contains a preemptor.
The terms on-and off-path preemption were popularized by Touretzky, et al. [41] . On-path preemption appeared first in Touretzky's work on inferential distance [39, 40] . Off-path preemption is described in a credulous version by Sandewall [32] ,13 in an ambiguity-blocking skeptical version by Horty, et al. [18] , and in both ambiguity-blocking and ambiguity-propagating versions by Haugh [16] .
Previous comparisons between on-and off-path preemption have resorted to arguments about the correct semantics of hierarchies with the topology of r 8 . The difference is reflerted in the hierarchy of figure 13 In r 8 , the edge b---e preempts the inference a-*e-barring both a -b-d-e, and a-c -d-e. On-path preemption allows a-*e, since a . c . d. e (as well as a 7 4 e, since a. b. -,e).
These arguments, based on the "intuitive" interpretation of rs with various names assigned to its nodes, are nothing more than ad hoc attempts at proof-by-example. We have argued that our approach to inheritance makes more principled comparison possible. In particular, by isolating the preemption strategies from the underlying theory, we can compare these criteria directly. In this section, we present the same approaches to off-path preemption as we have described for on-path, above. At the end of this section, vie show that the principles brought out by analyzing the two types of inheritance within our framework can be constructively compared, and give some opinions as to the relative merits of on-vs. off-path preemption. The definition of preemptor remains the same. Because off-path preemption says that no (unambiguous) path through v to z may contain a preemptor of v-(-,)z, this definition does not need to explicitly exclude redundant paths.
We say that r off-path supports a--+z (resp., a 7 4 z) if there is some sequence of off-path admissible edges a. s 1 .-. -s, z (resp., 'a -aI n -:z) in r w.r.t. a.
Model-Theoretic Semantics Here, we simply replace the definition of admissibility in the model-theoretic semantics of section 4.2 with that of the preceding paragraph.
If Xr and Yr. are two credulous extensions of an inheritance hierarchy r w.r.t. focus node a, then off-path specificity prefers Xr to Yrif there are some nodes v and z such that 1. Xr and Yr agree on all edges whose endpoints topologically precede z, 2. The edge v. (-,)z is off-path inadmissible in r w.r.t. a, and 3. Yr. contains that inadmissible edge.
Xr does not contain it.
The model-theoretic semantics for credulous extensions remains as described in section 4.1.
Minimal extensions under this ordering are the off-path preferred credulous extensions of r w.r.t. a, and their models are the off-path preferred models of r w.r.t. a: r off-path supports an inference iff that inference is entailed by some off-path model of r w.r.t. its focus node. By changing specificity criteria, we obtain different conclusion sets and correspondingly different preferences over credulous extensions. In general, it should be possible to obtain these results using a preemption strategy corresponding to any upwards theory of inheritance. Computing Specificity The algorithm for computing the specificity extension of a hierarchy w.r.t. a focus node can be adapted for off-path preemption:
COMPUTE-OFF-PATH-SPECIFICITY-EXTENSION (1, a) ; r' will be the Let flr contain the a-reachable nodes of r, and no edges.
; off-path specificity eztension of r w.r.t. a. On-or Off-Path? By defining off-path preemption in this framework, we can compare its underlying assumptions to those of on-path preemption, presented above. By examining the differences in preference criteria, we see the principles behind these two types of reasoning:
On-path preemption: an edge is inadmissible if every (non-redundant) admissible prefix contains a preemptor.
Off-path preemption: an edge is inadmissible if any (unambiguous) admissible prefix contains a preemptor.
That is, off-path preemption replaces the existential quantifier in the on-path definition of admissibility with a universal. Let ti, ... ,t, be many types of ts, each differing from the typical t in specific ways. For example, t might be birds, and the t 1 might be flightless birds, tiny birds, songbirds, etc.. Each of these categories inherits most of the default properties of birds, but overrides some particular default. Now, if some particular bird inherits from several of these ti, what are its expected properties?
Off-path preemption says that a particular bird is atypical for a particular default if it is a member of any ti that overrides that default-e.g., doesn't fly if it's a penguin-even if it's a member of many other subclasses-songbirds or even tree-dwelling birds-that are normal for the default. In other words, off-path preemption overrides default behavior whenever possible.
In contrast, on-path preemption remains agnostic about overriding defaults. If something is a member of an atypical subclass ti, it certainly may be atypical for the corresponding property of t:
penguins may not fly. However, if it is also a member of ti which does not override that default-a songbird or tree-dwelling penguin-then it may arguably possess default behavior-it may be a flying penguin, after all.
The reason for defining t 1 , ... , tn as subtypes of t is generally to enforce certain distinctions between the tis and typical ts: subclasses are not the same as their superclasses, or we wouldn't have defined the subclass in the first place. The argument in favor of off-path reasoning says that anything which is a ti should probably be assumed to be at least as unusual as tis. Off-path preemption's strategy is to assume maximal atypicality. In contrast, on-path preemption concedes that there are arguments both ways. One argument relies on the default behavior of subclasses, while the other depends on the explicit information about atypicality. On-path inheritance makes no distinction between these, while off-path inheritance favors the explicit overriding of defaults. If we are confident that our hierarchy is fully fleshed out and contains all relevant information, it may well be that off-path preemption provides a more appropriate description of our intuitions.' [411 attempt to overcome this difficulty. They delimit a space of existing and potential inheritance theories, identifying several dimensions along which these theories vary. Nonetheless, this work still relies largely on examples rather than principles, and does not separate ambiguity-resolution from the space over which the ambiguities arise.
A second attempt to unify and compare existing inheritance theories is due to Haugh [16] . Haugh translates inheritance theories into circumscriptive meta-theories. His theory is modular with respect to the preemption axioms used, and indeed he presents preemption axioms for theories of credulous inheritance, skeptical inheritance both as presented by Horty, et al. [18] and in a corresponding ambiguity-propagating form, and various types of off-path preemption. However, he does not distinguish a set of interpretations corresponding to these preemption axioms, making it difficult to identify the intuitive principles to which his various axioms correspond. Haugh's confounding of meta-strategies for addressing ambiguity-credulous versus skeptical reasoningwith particular ambiguity-resolving heuristics-on-versus off-path, etc.-is a further symptom of this failure to identify the underlying space over which ambiguity quantifies.
The numerous preemption strategies in the literature result from differing interpretations of the notion of "subclass," or specificity. The underlying principle is that more specific information should override more general. But there is little agreement on a single definition of "more specific" at the level of the nodes and edges of an inheritance hierarchy. In the body of this paper, we present on-path preemption, which is conservative with respect to the acceptance of abnormality. In section 8, we present off-path preemption, which provides a more promiscuous approach to abnormality in inheritance.
The different treatments of true ambiguity are reflected in the debate over skeptical inheritance. In section 7, we describe previous approaches to skeptical inheritance, and demonstrate the shortcomings of path-based skeptical approaches.
"1An anecdotal aside: I was particularly surprised to reach this conclusion, myself. I'd been a long-standing opponent of off-path preemption, but when I'd gotten the principles worked out, I have to admit that I found myself convinced. I present this as anecdotal evidence that understanding the underlying principles really does help sort out the "right" intuitions-LAS By making various choices on the skeptical/credulous spectrum, and in on-vs. off-path preemption, we can describe many of the existing theories of inheritance. For example, Sandewall's theory [32] is off-path and credulous; Horty, et al.'s [18] is off-path and ambiguity-blocking. Touretzky's original theory [39, 40] is a downwards version of the on-path creduous theory presented in sections 3-5.
By describing other inheritance theories in the framework presented here, we obtain not merely soundness and completeness results, but a more profound understanding of the underlying principles. This allows us to make comparisons based not on ad hoc examples, but on intuitions that underly them.
Proof: 1 * 2: By definition, a hierarchy Xr J> a-+z iff z is positively a-reachable in Xr by an admissible path; but since a credulous extension is unambiguous, every path is admissible.
2 €* 3: =ý: Assume that z is positively a-reachable in Xr., i.e. (3 s "--s, ) a - 
• 4:
This follows from the soundness and completeness of propositional logic: a formula is derivable from a propositional theory iff every model of that theory entails that formula.
A.2 Soundness and Completeness
The following lemma is used in the proof of several theorems, in this section and elsewhere. It says that any unambiguous a-connected subhierarchy of r can be extended to make it maximal-i.e., a credulous extension of r w.r.t. a.
Lemma 2.1 (Extension Construction)
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, and let {vi z-} be an unambiguous a-connected subhierarchy of r. Then The following lemma says that every edge of a preferred credulous extension of r is admissible in r. Lemma 
2.2
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a E Vr, and let Xr E Pref(r, a) be a preferred credulous eztension of r w.r.t. a. Then every edge v. (-,)z in Xr is admissible in r w.r.t. a.
Proof: Assume that there is an edge in Xr that is inadmissible in r w.r.t. a. There must be some inadmissible edge, say v . z, for which every edge whose endpoints topologically precede z is admissible. Since v.z E E-r, there must be some path a~ur..s,.v~z E E:Ga (a credulous extension of r w.r.t. a is a-connected). Certainly, this path is not admissible in r w.r.t. a (else v . z would be admissible in r w.r.t. a); but by hypothesis, v -z is the only inadmissible edge in it (since all other edges topologically precede v -z adding it to X!' would make XEr£ ambiguous--but then Xr must be ambiguousor not a-connected-but then Xr must not be a-connected. So no such edge can exist, and Exr -E Mr = 0, i.e. Xr = x!'; and X-r = Xr E 'ref (r, a).
Corollary 4.2
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a E Vr. Let E: be the specificity eztension of r o.r.t. a. Then r 1> a---z iff z is positively a-reachable in E.r (reap., a 7 4 z and negatively a-reachable).
Proof:
*: If r 1> a-*z, then there is some (non-redundant) sequence of admissible positive edges a. si ---s, -z in r (containing no preempting intermediary). Since each of these edges is admissible in r, by theorem 4, each of these edges is in E.; so z is positively a-reachable in Er.
€=:
If Err does not contain a positive path from a to z, then (by theorem 4) there is no sequence of admissible edges from a to z in r, so r 1, a--+z. Proof:
Let T be the set of all possible truth-assignments to the variable corresponding to the nodes of Vr. If T E T is a truth-assignment to the variables corresponding to Vr, and jz]jr is a propositional formula over these variables, then T(IU[r) is the truth-value assigned to the formula jIjr1 under T in the traditional sense.
Let {Xr} be the set of credulous extensions of r w.r.t. a.
Truth Assignments to Credulous Extensions:
Define o: T -, {Xr} as
I{t Is .(-)
Er or t. (-)v Er}
EI(T) = {stEEriT(Jsjr) =T(It r) = [T]}
U{s.
-
t E Er I T(sJr) = [T] and T([Tr)= [T]}
We claim that 'p(T) is a credulous extension of r w.r.t. a.
1. Certainly, W(T) is a subhierarchy of r. So it cannot be the case, for any s 1 ,s 2 ,t, that both s, • t and S2 • -it are in E,,(T). Corollary 5.1
W(T) is
cp(T) is
Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a, z E Vr. Then RxE is satisfiable iff x is positively a-reachable in r. (resp., JY]r and negatively a-reachable). Let r be an inheritance hierarchy, with a, z E Vr, and let Er be the specificity eztension of r w.r.t. a. Then lz]ac is satisfiable iff r 1> a--+z (resp., EX-1,r and a74z). It follows that ['2.u is valid iff a--+z holds in every credulous extension of E w.r.t, a; but by corollary 4.1, the credulous extensions of Er w.r.t. a are precisely the preferred credulous extensions of F w.r.t. a.
Theorem 6
Proof in text Corollary 6.1 (Complexity of Skeptical Inheritance) Ideally skeptical inheritance-computing the intersection of preferred credulous eztensions-is 0(ns).
Proof in text
